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United States v. Boynton: A Bona Fide
Reason For Applying A Subjective




In August of 1995, the Fourth Circuit upheld the convic-
tions of three defendants in United States v. Boynton' for
hunting migratory birds over a baited area in violation of the
anti-baiting regulation.2 The court, disagreeing with the
Sixth Circuit,3 held that misdemeanor violations of the Mi-
gratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA),4 including hunting over a
baited area, are strict liability crimes and, therefore, an ob-
jective standard should be used to determine the applicability
of the "bona fide agricultural operations or procedures" excep-
tion to the anti-baiting regulation. 5 The court held that re-
quiring proof of a farmer's subjective intent in scattering
grain would be contrary to the strict liability nature of the
offense. 6
This holding demonstrates the difficulty that courts con-
front when deciding whether to apply an objective standard
or a subjective standard to the exceptions of the anti-baiting
* The author would like to thank his mother, father, and brothers for all
their endless love and support.
1. 63 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. See 50 C.F.R. § 20.21(i) (1994).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Brandt, 717 F.2d 955, 958 (6th Cir. 1983)
(holding that "the crucial inquiry with respect to the exceptions" to the anti-
baiting regulation is determining "the intent of the person seeding the field,"
and this is "simply a fact that has to be proven as in any trial involving intent
as an element of the offense").
4. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1994).
5. See Boynton, 63 F.3d at 337.
6. See id. at 343.
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regulation,7 as promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior
pursuant to the MBTA.8 This difficulty has led to a division
between the federal circuits in determining which standard is
more in accordance with congressional intent.9 The circuits
are also divided on other key aspects of the anti-baiting provi-
sion due to its inherent interpretative difficulties. 10 These
differences among the circuits should be resolved for the anti-
baiting regulation "is a national one, founded on a treaty, and
[it] should not mean one thing in one state and another
elsewhere.""
This Case Note suggests that the better interpretation of
the anti-baiting regulation is requiring proof of the intent of
the person who seeded the field, as is exemplified in the Sixth
Circuit's analysis, as opposed to the technical inquiry used in
Boynton to determine the confines of accepted farming prac-
tices in the community. If the Sixth Circuit's reasoning was
to be followed, the intent would just be "a fact [that has] to be
proven as in any trial involving intent as an element of the
7. See 50 C.F.R. § 20.21(i) (1994).
8. See 16 U.S.C. § 704 (Pursuant to the MBTA, the Secretary of the Inte-
rior is authorized to adopt suitable regulations determining when, and to what
extent, it is compatible with the conventions to allow for the hunting of migra-
tory birds).
9. See Boynton, 63 F.3d 337 (holding that an objective standard is used to
determine the applicability of the "bona fide agricultural operations or proce-
dures" exception to the anti-baiting regulation). But see United States v.
Brandt, 717 F.2d 955 (holding that the crucial inquiry is a subjective measure
of the grain scatterer's intent as to determine whether the planting or operation
is "bona fide").
10. See Arthur E. Schmalz, The Anti-Baiting Regulation Pursuant to the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Have the Federal Courts Flown the Coop, or is the
Regulation for the Birds? 14 Gao. MASON Rav. 407 (1992). See, e.g., United
States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Ky. 1939) ("scienter is not a necessary
element" for obtaining a conviction under the anti-baiting regulation); United
States v. Jarman, 491 F.2d 764, 767-68 (4th Cir. 1974) (the words "on or over a
baited area" should be construed very broadly and there is no implied spatial
limitation to the extent of the baited area); compare with, United States v.
Delahoussaye, 573 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 1978) (a "minimum form of scienter"
is a necessary element for a conviction under the anti-baiting regulation);
United States v. Bryson, 414 F. Supp. 1068, 1074 n.10 (D. Del. 1976) (the words
"on or over a baited area" should be "given their literal meaning" and read very
narrowly and a spatial limitation is implied to the extent of the baited area).
11. United States v. Catlett, 471 U.S. 1074, 1075 (1985) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting United States v. Delahoussaye, 573 F.2d at 913).
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offense." 12 This interpretation is in accordance with the in-
tent of the Secretary of the Interior who was not trying to
distinguish "between orthodox and unorthodox farming prac-
tices,"1 3 but to distinguish between areas to which birds are
allured as a result of legitimate farming practices and areas
effected by baiting.14
This interpretation would simply require that a hunter
ascertain the intent of the person who seeded the area being
hunted before beginning the hunt, and if the hunter was mis-
taken in his conclusion, he would be criminally responsible.15
A person lacking criminal intent could still unwittingly vio-
late the anti-baiting regulation, but this "is inherent in all so
called 'public welfare offenses' wherein scienter is not an ele-
ment of the offense." 16
Part II of this Case Note discusses the history of the
MBTA in general, and then specifically focuses on the legisla-
tive and statutory authority of the anti-baiting regulation,
and the case-law pursuant to it. In particular, this Case Note
highlights United States v. Brandt,17 the only other reported
case which discusses the "bona fide agricultural operations or
procedures" exception to the anti-baiting regulation that
states whether the court was relying on an objective or sub-
jective measure to determine whether the practice was "bona
fide." Part III of this Case Note explains the factual and pro-
cedural history of United States v. Boynton.18 Part IV dis-
cusses the -current division between the circuits in
determining the standard to be used to decide the applicabil-
ity of the exceptions to the anti-baiting regulation, and sug-
gests a much needed solution to this problem. Part V
contains a brief synopsis and several concluding remarks.




16. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (holding that
scienter as an element of a statutory offense is a question of legislative intent).
17. Brandt, 717 F.2d at 955.
18. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337.
7691997]
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II. Background
The general views toward migratory birds and wildlife in
early America were quite different from the views in the
1990's. 19 Wildlife was historically viewed by society as a in-
exhaustible source of food and clothing.20 This was due to the
fact that the vast number of wild animals seemed astonish-
ing, which fostered "a belief that controls on their destruction
were unnecessary."2 1 The result of this perception was that
many game species quickly began to decline in number, if not
completely disappear.22 As a result of this often wanton de-
struction, it became apparent that some form of regulation
was necessary to prevent the destruction of wildlife.23 How-
ever, it was unclear as to whether this responsibility should
remain with the states' governments or the federal
government. 24
Finally, in 1894, the federal government circuitously
gave rights to wildlife with the establishment of Yosemite
and Yellowstone National Parks.25 Shortly after these parks
were established, Congress enacted legislation that protected
wildlife within park boundaries. 26 Then in 1900, Congress
19. See George Cameron Coggins and Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection
and Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. CoLo. L. REV. 165, 167
(1978).
20. See id. For example, in 1857 the Ohio Legislature declined to pass a bill
protecting the "wonderfully prolific" Passenger Pigeon. "There is no doubt about
where those millions have gone. They went down and out by systematic, whole-
sale slaughter for the market and the pot, before the shotguns, clubs and nets of
the earliest American pot hunters. Wherever they nested they were slaugh-
tered." quoted in W. HORNADAY, OUR VANISHING WILDLIFE: ITS EXTERMINATION
AND PRESERVATION 11 (1913).
21. Craig D. Sjostrom, Comment, Of Birds and Men: The Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 26 IDAHO L. REV. 371, 372 (1989). See also D. L. ALLEN, OUR WILD-
LIFE LEGACY 258-276 (rev. ed. 1962) (explaining that the costs of wildlife ex-
ploitation were considerable).
22. See Sjostrom, supra note 21, at 371.
23. See David G. Lombardi, The Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Steel Shot Ver-
sus Lead Shot For Hunting Migratory Waterfowl, 22 AKRON L. REV. 343 (1989).
24. See id. at 343.
25. See id.
26. See Act of May 7, 1894, Ch. 72, 28 Stat. 73 (53d Cong., 2d Sess. 1894).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/10
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went a step further and passed the Lacey Act, 27 which
criminalized transporting or selling in interstate commerce
any animal taken illegally from the state of provenance. 28
In 1913 another important step was taken towards fed-
eral wildlife preservation with the passage of the Migratory
Bird Act of 1913.29 This Act was designed to allow Congress
to take custody of birds living in the United States.30 Consid-
erable doubt existed, however, as to whether Congress had
the power to pass such legislation and within one year, the
Act was challenged on constitutional grounds in United
States v. Schauver.31
In Schauver, the defendant was arrested under the Mi-
gratory Bird Act of 1913;32 but the legislation was struck
down and declared invalid as "beyond that power" delegated
to Congress.3 3 The defendant claimed that the federal gov-
ernment had no right to regulate migratory birds because
such birds were the property of the state they inhabited.34
The federal government argued that it had constitutional au-
thority for the regulation of migratory bird species on three
separate grounds. 35
First, the federal government claimed that it had the
power to regulate migratory birds as property of the United
States. 36 The government based its argument on the fact
27. See Act of Mar. 25, 1900, § 31 Stat. 187 (Congress did this pursuant to
its authority under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art I,
§ 8 cl. 3). This Act was later expanded by the passage of the Back Bass Act of
1924, 16 U.S.C. § § 851-856 (1994).
28. See id.
29. See Act of Mar. 4, 1913, Ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847 (62d Cong. 3d Sess.).
30. See id.
31. 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914), appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 594 (1919). See
also United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915) (invalidating the
1913 Act as legislation beyond the powers delegated to Congress).
32. See supra note 29.
33. See Schauver, 214 F. at 154.
34. See id. at 157 (This argument comes from the case of Geer v. Connecti-
cut, 161 U.S. 519, 527 (1896), which held that people of a state have a "transient
property interest in wildlife, so long as the wildlife remains within the bounda-
ries of that state").
35. See id. at 157-62.
36. See id. at 156. The government based this argument on U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 3, cl. 2
1997]
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that migratory birds do not remain for "the entire year within
the borders" of a particular state.37 Therefore, they are not
property of any state, and are "within the custody" and pro-
tection of the federal government. 38 The district court con-
cluded that the federal government had no property interest
in migratory wildlife, since animals residing in a state were
owned by that state "for the benefit of [its] people in
common."
39
Secondly, the federal government argued that it had con-
current jurisdiction of migratory wildlife with the states.40
The government concluded that this concurrent jurisdiction
remained a dormant right of the federal government until it
became readily apparent that the states could not effectively
pass legislation protecting migratory wildlife.41 The govern-
ment determined that its right was no longer dormant be-
cause the states could not sufficiently protect migratory
birds. 42 However, the Court conservatively held that since
the power to regulate migratory birds was not an express
power delegated to the federal government, the states kept
the power to effectively regulate wildlife pursuant to the
Tenth Amendment. 43
Thirdly, the federal government argued that migratory
birds were items of interstate commerce, and therefore sub-
ject to federal regulation.44 The government asserted that
migratory birds were articles of interstate commerce because
as they traveled from state to state, so did the birds' owner-
ship.45 However, the court held that migratory wildlife was
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution
shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United
States, or of any particular State.
37. See supra note 29.
38. See id.
39. See Schauver, 214 F. at 157.
40. See id. at 156-57.
41. See id. at 157.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Schauver, 214 F. at 160.
45. See id.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/10
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not an article of interstate commerce because it was already
recognized as an article of intrastate commerce. 46 Due to the
federal government's failure to demonstrate that any provi-
sion in the Constitution allowed it to regulate migratory birds
when they were located within a state, the court held that the
legislation was unconstitutional. 47
After failing to establish constitutional authority to regu-
late migratory wildlife, the federal government appeared de-
void of the authority to address the need for the preservation
and regulation of migratory birds.48 While frustrated by the
Schauver decision, the government realized the necessity for
a single, comprehensive regulation. However, the govern-
ment was forced to sit idly by and accept that the states re-
tained the sole right to regulate wildlife.49
The government appealed the Schauver decision and the
Supreme Court set a date for arguments. 50 The issue was
never decided, however, because in 1916 at the request of
Congress,51 Secretary of State Lansing and Senator Elihu
Root found a constitutional "solution that present-day inter-
preters of the MBTA would do well to imitate."5 2 By utilizing
the treaty power, they negotiated the Convention with Great
Britain, on behalf of Canada,53 to accomplish the same objec-
tive as the 1913 Act.54
This Convention between the United States and Canada
designed a treaty for the protection of migratory birds,55
46. See id. at 161.
47. See id.
48. See Lombardi, supra note 23, at 345.
49. See id. (citing JAMES A. TOBER, WHO OwNs THE WILDLIFE? THE POLIT-
ICAL ECONOMY OF CONSERVATION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 139
(1981)).
50. See Coggins and Patti, supra note 19, at 169.
51. See Bob Neufeld, Comment, The Migratory Bird Treaty: Another
Feather in the Environmentalist's Cap, 19 S.D.L. REV. 307 (1974).
52. Sjostrom, supra, note 21, at 373. See also J. TREFETHEN, AN AMERICAN
CRUSADE FOR WILDLIFE 153-55 (1975).
53. See Convention with Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory
Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702 (1916), T.S. No. 628 (At the time of this
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many of which were "in danger of extermination through lack
of adequate protection during the nesting season or while on
their way to and from their breeding grounds." 56 The fin-
ished treaty was a uniform regulation, designed to protect all
migratory species of birds.57 It was divided into nine arti-
cles, 58 and although the Treaty was comprehensive, it failed
to impose any penalties for the violation of its terms.59
This "loophole in the treaty was later rectified when Con-
gress enacted" the implementing legislation,60 known as the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA).61 The MBTA created
specific criminal penalties for violators including fines and
jail terms.62 President Woodrow Wilson signed the MBTA
into law on July 3, 1918,63 which codified the Treaty.6 4 The
Treaty asserts that:
it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any
manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to
take, capture,... any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg
of any such birds..., included in the terms of the conven-
tions between the United States and Great Britain for the
protection of migratory birds .... 65
Moreover, the MBTA gives the Secretary of the Interior the
authority:
to carry out the purposes of the conventions ... to deter-
mine when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means, it
is compatible with the terms of the conventions to allow
hunting, taking, capture, killing, .. of any such bird, or
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See Convention with Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory
Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702 (1916), T.S. No. 628.
59. See Neufeld, supra note 51, at 310.
60. Lombardi, supra note 23, at 346.
61. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, § 2, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (current
version at 16 U.S.C. § 703-712 (1994)).
62. See 16 U.S.C. § 707.
63. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (World War I had diverted the nation's attention
away from birds for several years before the Treaty could be signed into law).
64. See Neufeld, supra note 51, at 310.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 703.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/10
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any part, nest, or egg thereof, and to adopt suitable regula-
tions permitting and governing the same .... 66
This transition from treaty to codified legislation was not
without problems though, and the MBTA was quickly chal-
lenged on the same basis as the Migratory Bird Act of 1913.67
In Missouri v. Holland,68 the State of Missouri claimed that
the Treaty was a violation of the Tenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution,69 and that Congress could not limit a
state's rights by regulating activity associated with migratory
birds through the enactment of a treaty.70 The Supreme
Court upheld the Act as a valid application of the treaty
power, thus evading the possible constitutional problems as-
sociated with the 1913 Act.71 The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Holmes, held that:
Here a national interest of nearly the very first magnitude
is involved. It can be protected only by national action in
concert with that of another power .... But for the treaty
and the statute there soon might be no birds for any power
to deal with. We see nothing in the Constitution that com-
pels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off
and the protectors of our forest and our crops are de-
stroyed. It is not sufficient to rely on the States .... The
treaty and statute must be upheld.72
The decision has since been labeled as one "that will give aid
and comfort to the advocates of unlimited [national] power,"73
66. 16 U.S.C. § 704 (The Convention allows both the United States and
British governments to pass legislation to assure that the goals of the Conven-
tion are carried out).
67. See Forrest Revere Black, Missouri v. Holland -A Judicial Milepost on
the Road to Absolutism, 25 ILL. L. REv. 911, 913 (1931).
68. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
69. See id. at 431.
70. See id.
71. See Sjostrom, supra note 21, at 373.
72. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
73. Black, supra note 67, at 916.
1997] 775
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and also as, "part and parcel of the great movement for con-
servation of natural resources."74
The facial constitutionality of the MBTA is no longer sub-
ject to serious debate.7 5 In conjunction with the treaty
power, 76 the present liberal interpretation of the Commerce
Clause 77 buttresses federal jurisdiction over migratory
birds. 78 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have explained that
"since migratory birds pass between states in their travels,
they are objects of interstate commerce [such] that federal
protection therefore attaches to them, and that Congress can
regulate or prohibit their taking within a state even in the
face of contrary state legislation."79
The MBTA authorized the federal government to regu-
late migratory birds through the treaty power, and the Cana-
dian Convention has been supplemented by a treaty with
Mexico in 1936,80 with Japan in 1972,81 and with the former
Soviet Union, that was signed in 1976 and ratified in 1978.82
Each of the additional treaties has been consolidated into the
MBTA by reference.8 3 These later codifications demonstrate
74. Sjostrom, supra note 23, at 373 (quoting Edward S. Corwin, Game Pro-
tection and the Constitution, 14 MICH. L. REv. 613, 625 (1916)).
75. See Sjostrom, supra note 21, at 373.
76. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
77. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
78. See id.
79. Comment, Federal Protection of Endangered Wildlife Species, 22 STAN
L. REV. 1289, 1300 (1970) (citing Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall, 96 F.2d 620, 624,
627, (9th Cir. 1938) and Cochrane v. United States, 92 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.
1937)).
80. See Convention between the United States and Mexico for the Protec-
tion of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311 (1936),
T.S. No. 912.
81. See Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Dan-
ger of Extinction, and Their Environment, Mar.4, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3329,
T.I.A.S. No. 7990 (1972).
82. See Convention for the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Envi-
ronments, Nov. 19, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 4647, T.I.A.S. No. 9073 (1976).
83. See 16 U.S.C. §703 (1994).
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter provided in
this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any man-
ner .... to kill... any migratory bird... included in the terms of the conven-
tions between the United States and Great Britain for the protection of
migratory birds concluded on August 16, 1916, the United States and the
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/10
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the "ever-broadening" scope of the MBTA.8 4 For example,
while the only species protected by the original convention
were those explicitly listed in the treaty,85 the treaty with
Mexico allows "the addition of migratory birds by families as
the Presidents of the two nations might see fit to include from
time to time."8 6
Since the MBTA was written in flexible language it can
be employed in situations that were not originally intended
when the Treaty was drafted. 87 The present trend has been
towards a progressive interpretation and expanded applica-
tion of the MBTA.88 This broad interpretation gives the
MBTA a certainadvantage compared to other specific envi-
ronmental statutes whose narrow interpretation and loop-
holes tend to weaken their impact.89
Pursuant to the MBTA, the United States Secretary of
the Interior is permitted, within specific limits dictated by
the Treaty, to establish regulations defining precisely when
and where migratory birds can be hunted. 90 The regulations
are then enforced by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
which is the authorized representative of the Secretary of the
Interior.91 One of these regulations is the anti-baiting regu-
United Mexican States for the protection of migratory birds and game mam-
mals concluded February 7, 1936, the United States and the Government of
Japan for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction,
and their environment concluded March 4, 1972, and the convention between
the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the conserva-
tion of migratory birds and their environments concluded November 19, 1976.
Id.
84. See Coggins and Patti, supra note 19, at 170.
85. See id. at 171.
86. Id. at 171-72; See generally Convention for the Protection of Migratory
Birds and Game Mammals, supra note 80, at 1314.
87. See Sjostrom, supra note 21, at 371.
88. See id.
89. See id. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1994) (The National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), for example, has been filled with attempts to
weaken and avoid its provisions).
90. See Schmalz, supra note 10, at 407. See 16 U.S.C. § 704.
91. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.1 (1994).
The regulations . .. promulgated to implement ... [the MBTA] ... [are] en-
forced by the [U.S.] Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife Service which regu-
late[s] the taking, possession, transportation, sale, purchase, barter,
exportation, and importation of wildlife.
1997] 777
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lation, embodied in 50 C.F.R. § 20.21 (1990), which banned
hunting migratory birds:92
(i) By the aid of baiting, on or over any baited area. As
used in this paragraph, "baiting" shall mean the placing,
exposing, depositing, distributing, or scattering of shelled,
shucked, or unshucked corn, wheat or other grain, salt, or
other feed so as to constitute for such birds a lure, attrac-
tion or enticement to, on, or over any areas where hunters
are attempting to take them; and "baited area" means any
area where shelled, shucked, or unshucked corn, wheat or
other grain, salt, or other feed whatsoever capable of lur-
ing, attracting, or enticing such birds is directly or indi-
rectly placed, exposed, deposited, distributed, or scattered;
and any such area shall remain a baited area following
complete removal of all such corn, wheat or other grain,
salt, or other feed. However, nothing in this paragraph
shall prohibit:
(1) The taking of all migratory game birds, including
waterfowl, on or over standing crops, flooded standing
crops (including aquatics), flooded harvested croplands,
grain crops properly shocked on the field where grown, or
grains found scattered solely as the result of normal agri-
cultural planting or harvesting; and
(2) The taking of all migratory game birds, except wa-
terfowl, on or over any lands where shelled, shucked or un-
shucked corn, wheat or other grain, salt, or other feed has
been distributed or scattered as the result of bonafide agri-
cultural operations or procedures or as the result of manip-
ulation of a crop or other feed on the land where grown for
wildlife management purposes: Provided, that manipula-
tion for wildlife management purposes does not include the
distributing or scattering of grain or other feed once it has
been removed from on the field where grown.93
The defendants were arrested for violating the aforemen-
tioned regulation in United States v. Boynton.94 The wording
Id.
92. See Schmalz, supra note 10, at 407.
93. 50 C.F.R. § 20.21(i) (1994) (emphasis added).
94. 63 F.3d 337.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/10
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of the first sentence of the regulation seems to forbid two dis-
tinct activities. 95 The first is "the taking of migratory birds
by the aid of baiting," and the second is, taking the birds "on
or over a baited area."96 As the regulation goes on to define
"baiting" and "baited area," it is apparent that there is no ref-
erence to intent as a necessary element of the offense, and
that the regulation is, on its face, a strict liability offense. 97
Consequently, a majority of the courts have determined that
intent is not an element of the offense. 98 This wholesale en-
dorsement of the strict liability nature of the MBTA is fol-
lowed by the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits as well as by a number of federal district courts. 99
An example of the strict liability interpretation is demon-
strated in United States v. Catlett.100 In this case, the Sixth
Circuit held that a defendant's state of mind is of no conse-
quence when enforcing the anti-baiting regulation pursuant
to the MBTA.101 The defendant was charged with "taking mi-
gratory birds on or over a baited area."1° 2 The defendant was
searching for morning doves during the hunting season in a
Tennessee field. 10 3 The court held that the field was "baited"
with corn nine days prior to the violation, and even though
95. See Schmalz, supra note 10, at 409.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234; United States v.
Reese, 27 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Tenn. 1939); United States v. Tarmon, 227 F.
Supp. 480 (D. Md. 1964); Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967); United States v. Wood, 437 F.2d 91 (9th Cir.
1971); United States v. Ireland, 493 F.2d 1208 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Jarman, 491 F.2d 764; United States v. Ardoin, 431 F. Supp 493 (W.D. La.
1977); United States v. F.M.C. Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978); United States
v. Green, 571 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brandt, 717 F.2d 955;
Catlett v. United States, 747 F.2d 1102, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074; United
States v. Chandler, 753 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Manning, 787
F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425 (3rd Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1019 (1987); United States v. Van Fossan, 899 F.2d 636
(7th Cir. 1990).
99. See Schmalz, supra note 10, at 410.
100. 747 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1984).
101. See id. at 1105.
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"there were only traces of bait left,"10 4 the conviction was af-
firmed since an area is considered "baited" for up to ten days
after the bait has been removed.105 The fact that there was
no evidence presented at trial showing that Catlett either
baited the field, or knew it was baited, did not stop the court
from deferring to the strict liability precedent expounded in
United States v. Green,10 6 which held that "the regulation
[does] not require proof of knowledge." 10 7
Catlett demonstrates the unjust results that are possible
based on the majority's strict liability approach. The court
recognized the harshness of its approach, as shown by the
apologetic tone of the opinion: "The unfortunate defendants
were apparently unaware of, and had not participated in the
baiting .... We concede that this is a harsh rule and trust
that prosecution will take place in the exercise of sound dis-
cretion only .... We reluctantly in this case must affirm." 08
The court seemed to have reservations about imposing strict
liability, but chose to follow nearly fifty years of precedent in
baiting cases dating back to 1939.109
The minority approach regarding the strict liability in-
terpretation of the anti-baiting regulation was set forth in
United States v. Delahoussaye.11° In Delahoussaye, the court
raised the scienter issue sua sponte, and determined that the
anti-baiting regulation requires a minimum form of scienter,
a "should have known form,""' which the court held was a
necessary element of a baiting offense. 112 The defendants in
Delahoussaye had been convicted of shooting ducks over a
baited area.113 It was clear that the defendants should have
104. Id. at 1103.
105. See 50 C.F.R. § 20.21(i) (1994).
106. 571 F.2d 1 (holding that the Government does not have to prove "that
the defendant knew the field on which he hunted was baited, or that defendant
had performed or had taken part directly or indirectly in the baiting, or that it
had been done for his benefit as part of hunting method").
107. Id. at 2 (citing United States v. Ireland, 493 F.2d 1208).
108. Catlett, 747 F.2d at 1103.
109. See supra text accompanying note 98.
110. 573 F.2d 910.
111. Id. at 912.
112. See id. at 912.
113. See id. at 911.
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seen that the area was baited. 114 Rather than raise the req-
uisite intent issue, the defendants argued that the regulation
was unconstitutionally vague. 115 The court stated:
We conclude that at a minimum [the bait] must have
been so situated that [its] presence could have been rea-
sonably ascertained by a hunter properly wishing to check
the area of his activity for illegal devices. There is no jus-
tice for example, in convicting one who was barred by a
property line from ascertaining that birds were being pul-
led over him by bait ... standing crops attract game quite
as well as bait does, and hunting over standing crops is
expressly permitted .... If the hunter cannot tell which is
the means next door that is pulling over him, he cannot
justly be penalized. Any other interpretation would simply
render criminal conviction an unavoidable occasional con-
sequence of duck hunting and deny the sport to those such
as, say, judges who might find such a consequence
unacceptable. 116
The approach taken in Delahoussaye was not based on
existing case law, but on a legitimate fear of convicting a sub-
jectively innocent person who lacks intent. 117 The court was
re-writing the regulation to include a non-existing element
into the statute, a "should have known" form of scienter. 118
The court was apparently trying to evade the obvious injus-
tice of the harsh operation of the regulation, and to prevent
the apparently law-abiding hunter from being convicted. 119
The Fifth Circuit upheld its position ten years later stating
that "unique among the circuits, we require a minimum level
of scienter as a necessary element of an offense of the
MBTA."120 Some evidence has emerged, however, that this
114. See id. at 912.
115. Delahoussaye, 573 F.2d at 912.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 912.
119. See id.
120. United States v. Sylvester, 848 F.2d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 1988).
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position is contrary to the intent of subsequent sessions of
Congress. 121
The Fifth Circuit is not the only jurisdiction to interpret
the regulation as requiring some "should have known" stan-
dard of scienter. 122 In United States v. Angueria, 23 a baiting
case from Puerto Rico, the First Circuit stated "we assume for
present purposes that scienter is required."1 24 The court
cited United States v. Sylvester 25 as authority, but the de-
fendants in Angueria were found to have known of the exist-
ence of the baiting and were convicted, 26 leaving the
language as mere dictum. Therefore, it is unclear if the First
Circuit follows the minority approach at this time, since the
court limited its support of the strict liability doctrine, "leav-
ing to another day the determination of that issue."' 27
The acknowledged division between the circuits regard-
ing the intent issue could have been settled when the Sixth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Catlett 28 was appealed
to the Supreme Court. However, certiorari was denied,
although not by a unanimous bench. 29 Justice White argued
that since the anti-baiting regulation "is a national one
founded on a treaty.. ., [it] should not mean one thing in one
state and another elsewhere."8 0 Justice White asserted that
certiorari should have been granted "to resolve the split
among the Court[s'] of Appeals,"' 13 but unfortunately the di-
vision among circuits continues.
A similar division between the circuits has recently de-
veloped in cases interpreting the "bona fide agricultural oper-
121. See S. Rep. No. 445, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128 ("Nothing in this amendment is intended to alter the
'strict liability' standard for misdemeanor prosecutions under 16 U.S.C.
§ 707(a), a standard which has been upheld in many Federal court decisions").
122. See United States v. Angueria, 951 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1991).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 15.
125. Sylvester, 848 F.2d at 520.
126. Angueria, 951 F.2d at 15-16.
127. See id. at 15.
128. 747 F.2d 1102, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074.
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ations or procedures" exception to anti-baiting regulation, 132
as promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior. The excep-
tions to the anti-baiting regulation allow for the hunting of
migratory birds over grains found scattered as the result of
"normal agricultural planting or harvesting" or "bona fide ag-
ricultural operations or procedures."1 33 The only reported
cases that have discussed the "bona fide" exception to the reg-
ulation besides United States v. Boynton, 3 4 are United States
v. Sylvester 35 and United States v. Brandt. 36
In Sylvester, the defendants' convictions for violating the
anti-baiting regulation were affirmed as the court held that
the defendants "should have known" that the field they were
hunting over was baited.1 37 However, the court did not state
whether it was relying on an objective or subjective standard
to determine whether the grain was scattered in a practice
that was "bona fide."138 In Sylvester, vast quantities of
clumpy and moldy grain were unevenly spread during the
two day period immediately preceding the hunting season. 39
The court may have objectively decided that it was neither an
agricultural operation nor a procedure to strew grain in this
manner. 40 The court could have also used this fact as cir-
cumstantial evidence to find that the person who dissemi-
nated the grain did not intend to partake in an agricultural
operation. 14' The opinion, while not giving clear authority
for either an "objective or ... subjective construction of the
regulatory language, reached a conclusion consistent with the
view that the statute should be read objectively. " 142
In United States v. Brandt, the court used a subjective
standard in determining the applicability of the "bona fide"
132. See 50 C.F.R. § 20.21(i) (1994).
133. See id.
134. 63 F.3d 337.
135. 848 F.2d 520.
136. 717 F.2d 955.
137. See Sylvester, 848 F.2d at 520.
138. See id. at 522-523.
139. See id. at 522.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 522-523.
142. Boynton, 63 F.3d at 345.
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exception. 143 In Brandt, the defendants were arrested for
hunting doves, a type of migratory bird, on a "baited area." 44
The charges were punishable by six months imprisonment
and a maximum fine of $500.145 The defendants consented to
a trial before a United States magistrate, and at the comple-
tion of the government's case, the charges were dismissed
when the magistrate held that the "anti-baiting regulation
was unconstitutionally vague." 146 The government appealed
the decision to the district court, which overruled the magis-
trate's determination and remanded the actions to the magis-
trate.147 Trials were then conducted before the magistrate
and the defendants were found guilty. 148 These convictions
were later affirmed by the district court. 149
The defendants then appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals and claimed that the "normal agricultural plant-
ing or harvesting" and "bona fide agricultural operations or
procedures" exceptions to the regulation were so vague, "that
they fail to give the person of ordinary intelligence a reason-
able opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may
act accordingly."5 0 The testimony presented at trial revealed
that agricultural practices varied greatly with respect to the
broadcasting of fields, leading the appellants to contend that
it was impossible to determine what practices were consid-
ered "normal" or "bona fide."' 15 The court held that the ex-
ceptions to the regulation did not require a hunter to engage
in a complex inquiry to determine the confines of customary
agrarian practices, but rather the inquiry should be a subjec-
tive interpretation "directed at determining the intent of the
person seeding the land." 52 The court affirmed the convic-
tions, holding "that the intent of the person seeding the field
143. See Brandt, 717 F.2d at 957-958.




148. See Brandt, 717 F.2d at 956.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 957 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)).
151. See Brandt, 717 F.2d at 957.
152. Id.
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is simply a fact to be proven as in any trial involving intent as
an element of the offense." 153
This same issue arose again twelve years later in United
States v. Boynton, but contrary to the holding in Brandt, the
court used an objective standard to determine the applicabil-
ity of the "bona fide agricultural operations or procedures ex-
ception."154 The court held that requiring proof of a farmer's
subjective intent in scattering the grain would be contrary to
the strict liability nature of the offense. 155
III. United States v. Boynton
On September 4, 1993, Stephen Boynton, James Booth,
and Bernard Dadds, Jr. were hunting for morning doves, a
type of migratory bird, in Queen Anne's County, Mary-
land. 156 The defendants were hunting over a field which was
"in effect, baited, by virtue of the presence of wheat seeds, a
grain which attracts doves."157 The wheat seeds were a com-
bination of low quality seeds and chaff, called "screenings."158
The screenings had been disseminated by using a spreader,
which left the grain dispersed on top of the soil without incor-
porating it into the soil. 1 59 The spreading covered an approx-
imately ninety yard tract next to a somewhat dried-up
pond.160 The grain was located both over and under the nor-
mal water line, on ground that was dry due to a recent
drought. 161 Since the ground was parched and the grain was
not mixed into the soil when it was spread one month earlier,
the grain had not germinated.16 2 All the hunters were cited
for hunting in a baited area by agents of the Fish and Wildlife
Service pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 703 et seq. and 50 C.F.R.
153. Id. at 958.
154. Id. at 337.
155. See id.
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§ 20.21 (i). 163 The three hunters conceded the preceding
facts, contested their citations and went to trial. 16 4
The evidence at trial conflicted as to "whether the man-
ner in which the grain was scattered was the result of normal
agricultural planting or harvesting or bona fide agricultural
operations or procedures, as those terms are defined by farm-
ers in the region, experts in agronomy, and the Fish and
Wildlife Service."165 There was also conflicting evidence
presented as to the subjective intent of Jay Quimby, the
farmer who scattered the grain.1 66
Jay Quimby alleged that he intended for the screenings
to sprout and form a root system so that it would help impede
leakage from the pond. 167 He contended that this had been
his practice for six years, and that in years in which there
was a normal amount of rainfall the "grain had sprouted and
helped retard the leakage."168 Jay Quimby claimed that he
had not "disced the wheat under, i.e., incorporated the seeds
into the soil," because this process would have only advanced
the leakage. 69 His father, Joseph Quimby, who owned the
land, stated that he "thought the grain had been placed there
to feed some ducklings who had been living on the pond but
who were then eaten by raptors."170
Jay Quimby asserted that before the hunt began, Joseph
Judge, the organizer of the hunt, had called him and asked
permission to use the area around the pond for hunting, but
had not asked if the area was "baited."' 7' Joseph Judge
stated that when he contacted Quimby, he "specifically asked
whether the area was baited, and Jay Quimby had said it was
not." 72 Judge also testified that prior to the hunt at the
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172. Id.
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/10
UNITED STATES V BOYNTON
had not discovered any grain. 173 He stated that he had also
been cited and fined for a baiting violation one week before
the Quimby farm hunt.174
The pond had been built with the assistance of public
funds from the Queen Anne's County Soil Conservation Ser-
vice (SCS) to relieve prior erosion. 175 Jeffrey Opel, a member
of the SCS dealing with erosion control permits, testified that
his "inspection of the pond revealed no signs of leakage, and
that a March 1993 SCS inspection did not report leakage." 76
Opel also stated that the procedure in which Quimby had
scattered the wheat around the pond was neither a "normal"
nor "recognized method of erosion control."' 77 During Mr.
Opel's testimony he alluded to an SCS statement of stan-
dards for planting in eroding areas, which made it a requisite
for "seedbed preparation when the ground was dry so that the
seed and soil will in fact mix. " 178 Quimby had not completed
such preparation. 79
Subsequent to the aforementioned citations being issued,
Joseph Judge asked Joseph Haamid, another employee of the
SCS who had accompanied Opel in inspecting the area
around the pond, to write a letter about what he had ob-
served.180 The letter was offered as a government exhibit and
it stated that "planting seeds below a pond's waterline is not
a normal stabilization (i.e., anti-erosion) practice."' 81 At trial
it was explained that this method of scattering wheat was not
considered normal because as the water level rises, the plants
and roots decompose and no longer provide "any anti-erosion
function."8 2 The letter also stated that SCS specifications for
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The letter declared that it is a "cultural practice" for some
farmers to spread seed without any soil preparation, but this
method demands "a higher rate of application." 184
An agronomist named Ronald Mulford, who had experi-
ence working with small grain, including screenings, also tes-
tified for the government. 185 He stated "that putting wheat
screenings on unprepared ground in the middle of the sum-
mer without incorporating the seed into the soil was not nor-
mal agricultural planting, and that wheat screenings planted
in this manner could not be expected to grow."186 Mr. Mul-
ford also testified that although "farmers sometimes use
screenings to create a cover crop," when it is done, the farm-
ers mix the seeds into the ground. 8 7 He stated "that when
the seed is not incorporated, it is not intended as a cover
crop."' 88
The government additionally introduced into evidence a
pamphlet which was available from Fish and Wildlife Service
interpreting the regulation that stated:
WHAT IS LEGAL
Any grain in the field must be the result of a normal
agricultural planting .... The agricultural planting must
be done in a way which uses the normal planting methods
in an area to produce an agricultural crop. Grain found in
piles or in other large concentrations is not a normal agri-
cultural planting. A normal agricultural planting includes
many factors such as recommended planting dates, proper
seed distribution, seed bed preparation, application rate,
and seed vitality ....
The normal planting must be done for agricultural
purposes. Planting wildlife food plots, planting a 'dove
field,' or sowing seeds for erosion control on a construction
site are not agricultural purposes. Dove hunts are not
legal over these areas ....
184. Id.
185. See id.
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There are several agricultural operations or proce-
dures other than planting or harvesting that scatter grain,
salt, or feed. These activities also attract doves. The Latin
words 'bona fide,' included in the hunting regulations
mean in good faith or without fraud. A well-intentioned
agricultural operation or procedure produces livestock or a
crop .... Dove hunting is legal on these areas as long as
these are 'bona fide' agricultural operations or
procedures. 189
The defense introduced the testimony of Bernard Dadds,
Jr., one of the defendants, who had taken a one-day class in
erosion control, 190 and he testified that "broadcasting seed
was a method of erosion control." 191 The defense also intro-
duced the testimony of Bernard Dadds, Sr., the defendant's
father who was an accomplished state natural resource police
officer.1 92 He stated that "broadcasting a crop is a bona fide
agricultural activity and that the method used around the
Quimby pond was a normal agricultural activity." 193
The magistrate judge who conducted a bench trial found
as a matter of fact that Jay Quimby, the farmer who dis-
persed the grain, did not intend to reap the product of the
grain.194 He, therefore, held that the first regulatory excep-
tion for "normal agricultural planting or harvesting" was not
satisfied. 195 The magistrate judge next stated, "I cannot find,
as a matter of fact, that Jay Quimby's intent was to spread
bait as the word is used [in the regulation]." 196 However, the
magistrate judge held as a matter of law that Quimby's in-
tent was not the determining factor as to whether the spread-
ing fell into the next regulatory exception, for "bona fide
agricultural operations or procedures."' 97 The magistrate ob-
jectively analyzed the facts encompassing the strewing and
189. Id. at 341.
190. See id.
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held that the scattered grain did not fall into the "bona fide"
exception.198 The magistrate determined that "there had to
be some mixing into the soil of the seed and not just laying
[the screenings] on top" for the method to be bona fide. 199
The defendants were all found guilty and each was fined
$190, with a $10 special assessment. 200
The defendants appealed to the district court, which ulti-
mately concurred with the magistrate judge's holding that
seeding done without the intent to reap is not considered
"normal agricultural planting or harvesting."20 1 The district
court also agreed with the magistrate judge's holding that
Jay Quimby's subjective intent in dispersing the seed was not
the determining factor as to whether the seed was dissemi-
nated as the result "of normal planting or bona fide proce-
dures."20 2 The district court affirmed all aspects of the
convictions because the evidence put forth at trial supported
the factual finding by the magistrate that "the spreading of
wheat screenings during a drought, without incorporation or
other measures to insure germination, for the claimed pur-
pose of stabilizing an erosion control pond was neither a 'nor-
mal' planting operation nor a 'bona fide' agricultural
operation or procedure."20 3
The defendants appealed this decision to the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals which recognized that "the proper con-
struction of... regulations is a matter of law," and reviewed
the district court's disposition of the matter de novo. 20 4 The
defendants claimed that "normal" and "bona fide" should be
interpreted to require as an element of the offense proof of
the intent of the person who seeded the field. 20 5 They argued
that the definitions of the words "normal" and "bona fide" re-
quire that "when the subjective intent of the person who scat-
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202. See id.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 342.
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harvesting, operation or procedure, hunting over the grains
falls within the exception."20 6 The defendants claimed that
the court should have required the government to prove it
was not the intent of Jay Quimby to partake in a soil control
procedure. 20 7 The defendants further argued that there was
insufficient evidence to determine that the procedure Quimby
used was not a "subjectively 'normal' or 'bona fide' method of
erosion control in the area."20 8
The Court of Appeals recognized that it was required to
give deference to the Fish and Wildlife Service's interpreta-
tion of that agency's own regulation, but it did not have to
uphold that interpretation if it was "plainly erroneous or in-
consistent with the regulation's language or the intent of the
regulation as manifest by the agency at the time of the regu-
lation's promulgation."20 9 The court stated:
On its face, the pamphlet issued by the Fish and Wildlife
Service interpreting 50 C.F.R. § 20.21 (i) did not support
the defendants' interpretation of 'normal agricultural
planting or harvesting,' but did support, to some extent,
the defendants' interpretation of 'bona fide agricultural op-
erations or procedures.' 210
The Fish and Wildlife Service pamphlet explains that the
first exception applies only to planting "done in a way which
uses the normal planting methods in an area to produce a
crop."21 ' Thus, the court held that the intent of the person
who scattered the screenings is not the determining factor for
the analysis, rather, the inquiry should be whether the seed
was scattered "by means of the methods used in the area to
produce a crop."21 2 The court held that this objective inter-
pretation of the regulation was neither incorrect nor illogical
within the regulatory scheme.213
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However, the court found that the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice's interpretation of the second exception, for "bona fide ag-
ricultural operations or procedures," introduced a subjective
element into the scheme. 214 The Fish and Wildlife Service
pamphlet is somewhat inconsistent on the point because it
states, "[t]he Latin words 'bona fide' included in the hunting
regulations mean in good faith or without fraud."215 This ap-
parently introduces a subjective element into the analysis. 216
However, after defining bona fide, the pamphlet reads, "a
well-intentioned agricultural operation or procedure pro-
duces livestock or a crop."21 7 This reintroduces an objective
element, even though if the inquiry were purely subjective, a
"bona fide" operation "might or might not produce livestock or
a crop."218
The court tried to solve this ambiguity and looked to the
history and structure of the MBTA.219 The court held that a
subjective interpretation is clearly incorrect and conflicted
with the regulatory scheme for two reasons. 220 The first is
that a subjective interpretation would be a radical change in
the regulatory scheme because no intent to alter it was sug-
gested by the Secretary of the Interior when the regulations
containing the "bona fide" exception were promulgated. 221
Secondly, the interpretation would lead to the foolish result
of requiring an intent element to be proven "when Congress
intended that misdemeanor violations of the MBTA be regu-
latory, strict liability crimes."222
The court was aware of the Fifth Circuit's position taken
in United States v. Delahoussaye,223 but noted that this hold-
214. See id.
215. Id.





221. See Boynton, 63 F.3d at 343.
222. Id. See supra text accompanying note 98 (indicating that since the pas-
sage of the Migratory Bird Treaty, the majority of courts have held that the
government is not required to prove intent as an element of the offense).
223. 573 F.2d 910.
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ing was "unique among the [c]ircuits," 22 4 and "contrary to the
intent of a subsequent Congress." 225 The court held that just
as "Congress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge
of the law,"226 "absent a clear manifestation showing of con-
trary intent, a newly-enacted or revised statute is presumed
to be harmonious with existing law and its judicial construc-
tion."227 The court noted that administrative agencies are
also presumed, absent a clear showing to the contrary, to
have instituted regulations "consistent with the existing reg-
ulatory scheme."228
Relying on these principles, and a background of nearly
consistent judicial interpretation of baiting violations being
strict liability crimes, the court declined to adopt an interpre-
tation that would require the prosecution to prove an intent
element of the crime. 229 The court held that requiring proof
of the subjective intent of a person who disperses the grain
would frustrate enforcement of the MBTA, and would pro-
duce the foolish result "clearly not contemplated by Congress,
of nullifying the ease of prosecution created by the designa-
tion of hunting over a baited area as a strict liability
crime."230
The court then looked at the defendants' assertion that
there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's
224. Boynton, 63 F.3d at 343 (quoting United States v. Sylvester, 848 F.2d at
522).
225. Boynton, 63 F.3d at 343. See supra text accompanying note 121.
226. Boynton, 63 F.3d 343 (quoting United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602,
605 (4th Cir. 1995)).
227. Boynton, 63 F.3d at 343. (quoting Estate of Wood v. C.I.R., 909 F.2d
1155, 1160 (8th Cir. 1990)).
228. Id. See also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983) (declining
to adopt a statutory interpretation which would result in "radical departure"
from established principles of law in the area, without a clear showing that
Congress intended to alter the existing principle).
229. See Boynton, 63 F.3d at 344.
230. Id. at 344-345. See United States v. Schultze, 28 F.Supp. at 236 (hold-
ing that "[i]t was not the intention of Congress to require guilty knowledge or
intent to complete the commission of the offense, and... accordingly scienter is
not necessary. The beneficial purpose of the [Migratory Bird] treaty and the act
would be largely nullified if it was necessary on the part of the government to
prove the existence of scienter on the part of the defendants accused of violating
the provisions of the act").
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finding that Jay Quimby's spreading of screenings was not
the "normal" and "bona fide" method in the area.28 1 The
court held that "[blecause the proper standard was an objec-
tive one rather than [a] subjective one, the defendants' attack
on the sufficiency of the evidence [did] not provide a basis for
challenging the convictions."23 2 Although the court held that
both sides had presented evidence of objectively normal and
bona fide agricultural practices in the community, on an ap-
peal, "the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the conviction" and the judgements were affirmed.233
IV. Analysis
In United States v. Boynton, the Fourth Circuit held that
an objective standard should be used to determine the appli-
cability of the "bona fide agricultural operations or proce-
dures" exception to the anti-baiting regulation. 234 The court
held that requiring the prosecution to prove the subjective in-
tent of the farmer who scattered the grain would be contrary
to the strict liability nature of the offense.235 The court's deci-
sion relied on a background of "nearly consistent judicial in-
terpretation" of baiting violations as being strict liability
crimes. 236 The court also looked at the legislative history of
the anti-baiting regulation to see if the Secretary of the Inte-
rior intended to alter the regulatory scheme in such a way as
to require the prosecution to prove intent as an element of the
offense. 237Even though over fifty years of case law and the legisla-
tive history of the anti-baiting regulation support the court's
holding, a detailed analysis of the language of the regulation
231. See Boynton, 63 F.3d at 345.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 346. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80
(1942); United States v. Ireland, 493 F.2d at 1208 (both holding that on appeal,
the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the
conviction).
234. See Boynton, 63 F.3d at 337.
235. See id. at 343.
236. See id. at 344.
237. See id. See also 38 Fed. Reg. 22015, 22022 (Aug. 15, 1973) (codified at 50
C.F.R. § 20.21 (i)).
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elucidates that the holding in United States v. Boynton is in-
consistent with the regulatory scheme. A better interpreta-
tion of the regulation was demonstrated in United States v.
Brandt, in which the court held that the crucial factual find-
ing in prosecutions arising under the anti-baiting regulation
should be determining the intent of the person scattering the
grain, and not the distinction between conventional and un-
conventional farming practices in the community. 238
An analysis of the anti-baiting regulation indicates that
it seeks to prevent the taking of migratory birds which have
been deliberately lured to an area by bait.23 9 However, mi-
gratory birds are also allured to grain and other screenings
that are scattered in the course of ordinary farming activi-
ties.240 The Secretary of the Interior concluded "that the tak-
ing of migratory birds over areas to which the birds are
attracted as a natural and ordinary consequence of agricul-
tural practices is compatible with the United States' obliga-
tions under the various migratory bird treaties."241
As a result of this determination, the Secretary provided
that the taking of migratory birds over "grains found scat-
tered as a result of normal agricultural planting or harvest-
ing" is not forbidden.242 The Secretary's intent was not to
differentiate between conventional and unconventional farm-
ing practices, but to differentiate between areas that birds
are attracted to because of legitimate farming practices, and
areas that birds are deliberately enticed by baiting.243 Even
though there may be many distinct methods for seeding and
harvesting in a community, as was demonstrated by the testi-
mony in United States v. Boynton, it is obvious that the main
purpose of the "normal agricultural planting and harvesting"
exception has as its primary goal, the development and reap-
ing of crops, and not the inveiglement of migratory birds. 244
238. See United States v. Brandt, 717 F.2d at 958.
239. See 50 C.F.R. § 20.21(i) (1994).
240. See Brandt, 717 F.2d at 957.
241. Id. at 957-958.
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This proposition was supported in Boynton by the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service pamphlet that the government intro-
duced into evidence at trial. 245 The pamphlet interpreted
this exception to apply only to planting "done in a way which
uses the normal planting methods in an area to produce an
agricultural crop."246
According to the manner in which the regulation is inter-
preted by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife agency, an objective
analysis is required for the "normal agricultural planting or
harvesting" exception. 247 The court in Boynton stated that
the intent of the person who scattered the seedings "is not
determinative," but rather, the relevant examination should
ask only whether the seed was scattered by utilizing means
adopted in the community to produce a crop. 248
The problem with this objective rationale, adopted in
Boynton, is that it is logically inconsistent. A farmer may
also be a hunter, and participating in farming activities, he
would definitely realize, and perhaps even aspire, that one of
the consequences of his activities would be attracting migra-
tory birds.249 If this were the case, the more sensible and per-
tinent inquiry should be a subjective one which would
determine whether the farmer's intent to lure birds caused
him to take measures he would not have ordinarily taken in
the growth of his crops. 250
Similarly, the "bona fide agricultural operation or proce-
dure" exception also favors the subjective interpretation
adopted in Brandt. The United States Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice pamphlet indicates that bona fide means "in good faith or
without fraud."251 An examination of the regulatory scheme
elucidates that an operation or procedure would be embarked
upon in good faith if it is done with an intent related to the
245. See Boynton, 63 F.3d at 341.
246. Id.
247. See id. at 342.
248. See id.
249. See Brandt, 717 F.2d at 958.
250. See id.
251. Boynton, 63 F.3d at 341. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 177 (6th ed.
1990) (defining "bona fide" as "in or with good faith; honestly, openly, and sin-
cerely; without deceit or fraud").
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growth of crops, such as, erosion control. 252 Therefore, the
words "bona fide" introduce a subjective element into the reg-
ulation making the critical inquiry, with respect to the excep-
tion, the intent of the person scattering the grain.253 The
regulatory language requires that intent be proven as an ele-
ment of the crime. 254
Nonetheless, due to the strict liability nature of the of-
fense, the hunter is therefore placed in an untenable posi-
tion.255 Before beginning the hunt, he must ascertain the
intent of the person who scattered the grain, and if he is in-
correct in that determination, he will be criminally liable.
256
However this is innate in all of the so called "public welfare
offenses," where proof of intent is not required as an element
of the offense.257 Furthermore, prosecutions for these types
of crimes have long been authorized by the courts. 258
As a result of the aforementioned ambiguities, the cir-
cuits are divided as to whether to apply a subjective stan-
dard, or objective standard, to the exceptions of the anti-
baiting regulation pursuant to the MBTA. The Fourth Cir-
cuit has held that requiring the prosecution to prove an in-
tent element would be highly untenable, and would
contravene Congress' intent that misdemeanor violations of
the MBTA be strict liability crimes.259 Thus, the court ap-
plied an objective standard to determine the applicability of





257. Brandt, 717 F.2d at 958. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250.
In Balint, the "[diefendants were charged under the Narcotics Act of 1914 with
selling certain amounts of a derivative of opium and coca leaves. The defend-
ants demurred to the indictment on the ground that it failed to charge that they
knew the content of the drugs that they sold. The district court quashed the
indictment, but the Supreme Court reversed." Id. at 257. The Court held that
the statute required the defendants to determine, at their own peril, whether
their activity came within the violation of the statute. See id. at 254.
258. See Brandt, 717 F.2d at 958.
259. See Boynton, 63 F.3d 337.
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the "bona fide agricultural operations or procedures"
exception. 260
The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion endorsed by this author,
held that requiring the prosecution to prove the intent of the
person seeding the field would not alter the strict liability na-
ture of the crime. 261 The court held that the intent of the in-
dividual seeding the field is the crucial factual finding in a
prosecution arising under the anti-baiting regulation, and the
hunter must ascertain, at his peril, whether a field has been
improperly baited.262
Due to the current division between the Circuits on this
key aspect of the anti-baiting regulation, and because the
main purpose of enacting federal regulations is to provide
uniformity throughout the states, this division should be ad-
dressed by the Secretary of the Interior.263 If the Secretary
believes that the interpretation adopted by the judiciary in
Brandt is incorrect, the regulation should be re-drafted to re-
quire the inclusion of the words "as defined by the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service" immediately after the words "normal
agricultural planting and harvesting," and "bona fide agricul-
tural operations or procedures." The first exception of 50
C.F.R. § 20.21(i) (1994) would then allow:
(1) the taking of all migratory game birds, including
waterfowl, on or over standing crops, flooded standing
crops (including aquatics), flooded harvested croplands,
grain crops properly shocked on the field where grown, or
grains found scattered solely as the result of normal agri-
cultural planting or harvesting as defined by the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service.264
260. See id.
261. See Brandt, 717 F.2d at 959.
262. See id.
263. The Secretary of the Interior might also want to address the "minimum
scienter" requirement that has been adopted by the Fifth Circuit for the anti-
baiting regulation. While the court's attempt to avoid the obvious injustice that
can follow a strict liability approach is a commendable endeavor, it plainly vio-
lates the intent of the drafters.
264. 50 C.F.R. § 20.21(i) (1) (1994).
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The second exception of 50 C.F.R. § 20.21(i) (1994) would
permit:
(2) the taking of all migratory game birds, except water-
fowl, on or over any lands where shelled, shucked, or un-
shucked corn, wheat or other grain, salt, or other feed has
been distributed or scattered as the result of bona fide agri-
cultural operations or procedures as defined by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service .... 265
These changes would make the standard for determining
the applicability of the exceptions to the anti-baiting regula-
tion purely objective, for the hunter could ascertain the farm-
ing practices of the community by questioning the Fish and
Wildlife Service before beginning in the hunt.2 66 This inquiry
would be more dependable and valuable for a hunter at-
tempting to avoid strict liability, than it would be asking the
person who scattered the seed what his intent was. 26 7 This is
because the person who seeded the field might not be avail-
able for guidance, and even if he were accessible, he would
have no obligation to be honest in his explanation. 268
In Boynton, for example, Jay Quimby had no duty to hon-
estly describe why he scattered the seed to Joseph Judge
when Judge contacted Quimby.269 However, if Judge had
contacted the Fish and Wildlife Service, the office, pursuant
to its obligation to uphold the MBTA, would surely have ad-
vised him "throwing screenings on the ground around a pond
is neither a normal planting nor a bona fide agricultural
method."270 Another benefit of the proposed change to the
regulation would be the continued designation by Congress of
hunting over a baited area as being a strict liability crime. 271
The person who seeded the field would not have to be subpoe-
265. Id. § 20.21(i) (2).





271. See Boynton, 63 F.3d at 345.
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naed and interrogated, nor would any witnesses. 272 This
would lessen the burden on the prosecution and uncharged
parties called to testify.273
V. Conclusion
The purpose of the anti-baiting regulation, which is cer-
tainly laudable, is to prevent the unsporting harvest of game
birds from hunting methods likely to jeopardize the bird's
existence. The Secretary of the Interior, who promulgated
the regulation pursuant to the MBTA, has determined that
hunting migratory birds over an area where seed or other
bait is scattered is generally prohibited. However, two excep-
tions to this general rule have been set forth in the anti-bait-
ing regulation. These are the "normal agricultural planting
or harvesting" exception, and the "bona fide agricultural op-
erations or procedures" exception.
A specific examination of the anti-baiting regulation com-
pels the conclusion that a subjective standard should be used
to determine the applicability of the these exceptions, con-
trary to what the court held in United States v. Boynton. An
analysis of the regulation demonstrates that it does not re-
quire a court or hunter to engage in a detailed inquiry to de-
termine the limits of recognized agricultural practices in the
community. Rather, as the court in United States v. Brandt
held, the relevant inquiry should be directed at determining
the intent of the person scattering the grain. The intent of
the individual scattering the grain should be the crucial fac-
tual finding in prosecutions arising under the regulation.
The objective standard adopted by the court in Boynton
clearly contradicts the Secretary of the Interior's intent. The
Secretary's intent was not to differentiate between conven-
tional and unconventional farming practices, but to differen-
tiate between areas to which birds are allured because of
legitimate farming practices and areas to which birds are de-
liberately lured by baiting. An objective construction of the
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The court in Boynton noted that the regulatory language in-
troduced a subjective element into the regulatory scheme, but
held that requiring the prosecution to prove an intent ele-
ment would contradict the intent of Congress that misde-
meanor violations of the MBTA be strict liability crimes.
If the Secretary of the Interior disagrees with the holding
in United States v. Brandt, he should resolve the division be-
tween the Fourth and Sixth Circuits by re-drafting the regu-
lation so as to eliminate the need for a subjective application.
This could be accomplished by the inclusion of the words "as
defined by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service" immediately at
the end of both exceptions. This proposal would make the
standard for determining the applicability of the exceptions
purely objective, thus, providing a more dependable and prac-
tical inquiry for the hunter attempting to avoid culpability.
Moreover, this proposed re-drafting would continue the ease
of enforcement of an indispensable hunting regulation, and
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which is the oldest and largest moot court competition of any
kind held in one location. The competition gives law students
from around the country the opportunity to develop skills in
environmental law and appellate advocacy.
The competition was originated by Pace students in
1988, and each year the Pace National Environmental Law
Moot Court Competition Board (PNELMCC Board), a board
comprised entirely of students, develops, organizes and hosts
the competition. This year, sixty-six teams attended oral ar-
guments, represented by nearly two hundred law students.
The environmental problem argued at the competition
was designed by Barry Breen, with help from the Environ-
mental Law Institute and Pace University. Each year the
problem focuses on an area of unsettled national environmen-
tal law. This year's problem focused on medical monitoring
cost recovery under CERCLA and the constitutionality of en-
vironmental statutes in issues of intrastate commerce.
Each team must brief and argue the two issues in the
problem. The competition format centers around three par-
ties, with each party briefing and arguing the two issues.
This three party format was selected to mirror actual envi-
ronmental litigation. While teams file briefs for only one
party, the oral arguments require the team to represent each
party in the successive rounds.
The Pace Environmental Law Review publishes the com-
petition's best briefs. This year, we commend the University
of Texas for its submission, which had the highest brief score
in the competition. The University of Baltimore and the Uni-
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versity of Houston had the best brief for their respective
parties.
The competition's bench memorandum is also published
by the Pace Environmental Law Review. The bench memo-
randum was written to assist the competition's judges in
evaluating both oral and written arguments.
The PNELMCC Board and Pace University congratulate
Southwestern University, the overall winner of the Ninth An-
nual National Environmental Moot Court Competition.
Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College and
the University of Memphis are also honored for their excel-
lent oral arguments in the Final Round of the competition.
Minjoo Lee of Washington University was the Best Oralist for
the competition.
Additionally, we commend the effort of all the people tak-
ing part in the competition as judges, brief graders, bailiffs,
advisors and participants. To all involved, we extend our
warmest appreciation.
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